

Authority MMO 963016

Report on Special Interrogation of
Drs. HUETTENHAIN and FRICKE, Oberst
METTIG and Lt. MORGENROTH carried
out on 29th July, 1945.

Attached are notes on a visit to
C.S.D.I.C. by Mr. FRANK LEWIS and Major
G.W. MORGAN, on 29th July, 1945. The
answers were subsequently discussed
with Mr. W.F. FRIEDMAN.

Ticom
30 July, 1945

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HUETTENHAIN and FRICKE

1. Hüttenhain and Fricke (and later Mettig) were asked about Secret inks and Microphotography. Each replied that these subjects were within the Abwehr domain, and that they could give no details. On these subjects see CSDIC report No. 1172. Fenner himself knew about it.
2. The Zählenwerken machine was also known to them as the G-machine. It had four wheels and no stecker. Dr. H. described its turnover. The detailed description of this machine will be given in another piece of homework.
3. No remembrance of Lt Col KEPP. ?HEPP
4. and 5. Statistical solution of Hagelin problems. In the first place the reference to a solution of C-36 on 200 letters of text was in TICOM I-31 paragraph 27; and since Dr. H. did not confirm this statement I think that we must have been mistaken in that report. Secondly the 5,000 letters of B-38 text was an isolated experiment, carried to the point "where it was seen that it would have succeeded if sufficient work had been put in". The experimenters moreover, had the advantage of being able to check their steps against the known true answer. Thirdly, the work was not done by H. and F. themselves. Markwart and Hilburg in IN7/VI, and Dr. Schultz in OKW/Chi were mentioned as workers directly concerned with this sort of problem. The χ^2 test referred to was, of course, the ordinary Pearson test.
6. They had no knowledge of the final whereabouts of Gen. Hayashi.
7. Knowledge of Allied interception and solution activities. They knew of the French Deuxieme Bureau, nothing of England, and all their knowledge of America came from Yardley's book "Black Chamber".

OBERST METTIG

He has already written the following homeworks:

1. Organisation, personalities and activities of In7/VI
2. Japanese Liaison
3. OKW Chi A 2(c) Menzer (RSHA)
4. Agent Monitoring Service
5. Russian Agents inside In7/VI

Notes

* and **

- * Cf CSDIC Report 1704 by Herzfeld
- ** A similar report on OKW/Chi is being written by Mettig
- *** Cf CSDIC Report 1715 on the Jap Liaison Party which included Morgenroth, Schubert and Opitz.
- **** There is also a homework by H. and F. on this.

Two odd points were mentioned to us by Capt. Ginsburg.

- i) Mettig states that the London Polish Government was the main source of leaks from G.B., and that the Germans were thereby encouraged to expect a rift between G.B. and U.S.S.R.
- ii) A Prof. Klassen (?) was mentioned as a German Secret Service man specialising on Japan.

It should be recorded that Col. Mettig was, when he first arrived at CSDIC, extremely reserved and unwilling to disclose information. By degrees he has been persuaded to become communicative. The unsatisfactory nature of the interrogation we now record is in part due to our own scanty German, Mettig's indistinct speech, and the fact that he is not a cryptographer.

Mettig brought with him to England a list of German successes in cryptanalysis, WNV notepaper, dated May 1945, prepared by Schubert, referring to period 1939-45. It is obviously incomplete. Although TYPEX is not mentioned, our first question as to whether they had any success with it, yielded the emphatic reply that it was 'gelesen' in 1942 in North Africa. This success continued from the summer to the autumn of 1942 (the "Seesohm incident"), and according to Mettig's statement they did not succeed in getting in again up to the time he left IN7/VI in the middle of 1943. He confirmed that the success was cryptographic and not based on compromise by capture, because it did not pass through him. [Subsequently the interrogators had grave doubts as to the truth of all this. There have been previous reports that the Germans were having success with TYPEX during the Tunisian campaign; and the reason advanced for a cryptographic as opposed to a compromise-capture success seems to operate entirely in the opposite direction]. However, down-right as Mettig was in some of his positive statements, he showed distinct difficulty in recalling his facts, and agreed to make a written statement when he had time to get his ideas into order. [It is recommended that when this report has been submitted, the interrogation should be resumed by an individual who combines in himself a good cryptographic knowledge of the relevant facts, and fluent German]

On the subject of M209, Mettig said that traffic from U.S. to G.B. was read in 1943 [Subsequently Mr. Friedman said there was no such traffic]. Asked to give a precise reply as to the proportion of M209 traffic read in 1944-5 he could only answer that it was a "large" proportion [It must be remembered that this work was in IN7/VI, after Mettig had left it]

There had been no exchange with the Japs. It was to have begun with the mission of Schubert, Opitz and Morgenroth. On the matter of crypt. of Jap. systems he gave the name of Adler (in the South!). He said that there had been little success with Jap systems, despite a message in clear and secret version (whether code or cipher he didn't know, nor what system)

Arising out of the question on secret inks (see above) he mentioned that the censorship (Auslands Brief Pruef. Stell.) passed letters to Mettig when a code or cipher was suspected. Huettenhain or Stein would have worked on them.

On the list of systems prepared by Schubert (see above) he could not enlighten us as to the nature of the American "FMC", which he said was a U.S. abbreviation [not known to Mr. Friedman] or of the British "Phantom Code".

LT. MORGENROTH

He has worked mostly in 4 SKI/III, but being selected to join the liaison party going to Japan he has at least a superficial knowledge of a large number of topics. For example, he spent a fortnight with OKH in Jan. '45 working on solution of M209, Western Front traffic. In this connection he mentions PIETSCH, DÖRING and

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VALENTINE (?).

On the Naval side he is able and ready (indeed anxious) to supply information on

- MERSIGS, Inship and Gen. Table
- MNC
- In-Out-Con
- Naval Cipher
- Traxo
- Agog (1600 gps reconstr. at time of capture)
- Cato
- Fleet Code (captured)
- Loxo
- Cofox
- Foxo
- Medox

M209

He has no knowledge of any work on Fr. Naval in 1944-5.

" " " " " " " " Jap Naval.

On Russian naval he referred to HACKE.